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Abstract
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against
memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical useful-
ness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and
brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach
based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses
dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weak-
nesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-
tion with minimal performance overhead.
1 Introduction
Run-time attacks that exploit memory errors to corrupt pro-
gram memory are a prevalent threat. Overflows of buffers
allocated on the stack are one of the oldest known attack
vectors [12, 17]. Such exploits corrupt local variables or func-
tion return addresses. Modern attacks techniques—such as
return-oriented programming (ROP) [16] and data-oriented
programming (DOP)[7]— can use this well-known attack vec-
tor to enable attacks which are both expressive and increas-
ingly hard to detect. The fundamental problem is insufficient
bounds checking in memory-unsafe languages such as C /
C++. Approaches for hardening memory-unsafe programs
have been proposed, but tend to incur high performance
overheads, and are therefore impractical to deploy [19]. An
exception is a technique called stack canaries [3], which is
both efficient and can detect large classes of attacks. Conse-
quently stack canaries are widely supported by compilers
and used in all major operating systems today [3, 10].
Widely deployed stack canary implementations suffer
from one or more of the following weaknesses: they 1) rely
on canary value(s) that are fixed for a given run of a pro-
gram [3]; 2) store the reference canary in insecure memory,
where an attacker can read or overwrite it [10]; or 3) use
only a single canary per stack frame and therefore cannot
detect overflows that corrupt only local variables.
The recently introduced ARMv8.3-A pointer authenti-
cation (PA) [1] hardware can be used to verify return ad-
dresses [14], effectively turning the return address itself into
a stack canary. However, PA on its own is susceptible to
reuse attacks, where an attacker substitutes one authenticated
pointer with another [9]. State-of-the-art schemes harden
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Figure 1. A stack canary is a value placed on the stack so
that it will be overwritten by a stack buffer that overflows
to the return address. It allows detection of overflows by
verifying the integrity of the canary before function return.
PA return-address protection to ensure that protected return
address as statistically unique to a particular control-flow
path, and therefore cannot be substituted by an attacker [8].
We propose fine-grained PA-based canaries which: 1) pro-
tect individual variables from buffer overflow, 2) do not re-
quire secure storage for reference canary values, 3) can use
existing return-address protection [8] as an anchor to pro-
duce canaries which are statistically unique to a particular
function call, and 4) are efficient, since they can leverage
hardware PA instructions both for canary generation and
verification.
Our contributions are:
• PCan: A fine-grained, and efficient PA-based ca-
nary scheme (Section 5).
• A realization of PCan for LLVM (Section 6).
• Evaluation demonstrating that PCan is both more
secure than existing stack canaries and has only a
small performance impact on the protected application
(Section 7).
2 Background
A stack canary[3] is a value placed on the stack such that
a stack-buffer overflow will overwrite it before corrupting
the return address (Figure 1). The buffer overflow can then
be detected by verifying the integrity of the canary before
performing the return.
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The initially proposed canaries were randomly generated
32-bit values assigned at process startup and stored within
the process memory [3]. The canaries must remain confi-
dential to prevent an attacker A from avoiding detection by
writing back the correct canary when triggering the buffer
overflow. Terminator canaries [4], consisting of string ter-
minator values (e.g., 0x0, EOF, and 0xFF) can prevent A
from using string operations to read or write whole canaries,
thereby thwarting run-time canary harvesting. Another ap-
proach is to re-generate canaries at run-time, for instance by
masking them with the return address [5]. However, such
techniques rely on the secrecy of the return address.
Multi-threading and forked processes are another chal-
lenge; a child process or thread using the same canaries as
the parent could be abused to perform a byte-by-byte guess-
ing without relying on memory disclosure vulnerabilities.
This is particularly useful for the attacker if the child process
or thread is restarted by the parent after a crash as a result
of an unsuccessful attack. In such a scenario an attacker can
execute a large number of guesses without being detected.
Adversaries with arbitrary memory read or write access
can trivially circumvent any canary based solution; using
reads alone allows A to first read the correct canaries from
memory and then perform a sequential overwrite that writes
back the correct canaries while corrupting other data.
2.1 Stack canaries in modern compilers
Modern compilers such as LLVM/Clang and GCC pro-
vide the -fstack-protector feature that can detect stack-
buffer overflows1. It is primarily designed to detect stack
overflows that occur in string manipulation. The default
-fstack-protector option includes a canary only when
a function defines a character array that is larger than a
particular threshold. The default threshold value in GCC
and LLVM is 8 characters, but in practice the threshold is
often lowered to 4 to provide better coverage. However, a
stack overflow can occur on other types of variables. The
-fstack-protector-all option adds a canary to all func-
tions. However, it can incur a substantial use of stack space
and run-time overhead in complex programs.
The -fstack-protector-strong option provides a bet-
ter trade-off between function coverage, run-time perfor-
mance, and memory cost of stack canaries. It adds a canary
to any function that 1) uses a local variable’s address as part
of the right-hand side of an assignment or function argument,
2) includes a local variable that is an array, regardless of the
array type or length, and 3) uses register-local variables.
Today -fstack-protector-strong is enabled by default
for user-space applications inmajor Linux distributions, such
as Debian and its derivatives2. -fstack-protector protects
non-overflowing variables by rearranged the stack such that
1https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/cfe-dev/2017-April/053662.html
2https://wiki.debian.org/Hardening
tag/PAC sign ext./PAC virtual address (AP)
reserved bit8 bits VA_SIZE bits
64-bit modifier (M)
PA key (K)HK(AP, M)
3 – 23 bits
general purpose registers
configuration register
Figure 2. PA verifies pointers using an embedded PAC gen-
erated from a pointer’s address, a 64-bit modifier and a
hardware-protected key. (Figure from [8])
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Figure 3. The signed return address generated by
-msign-return-address effectively serve as a canary by
allowing detection of stack-buffer overflows.
an overflow cannot corrupt them; but this protection can-
not protect other data (e.g., other buffers). On AArch64 the
LLVM/Clang implementation of -fstack-protector uses
a single reference canary value for the whole program. This
in-memory reference canary is used to both store and verify
the stack canary on function entry and return, respectively.
2.2 ARMv8-A Pointer Authentication
ARMv8.3-A PA is a instruction set architecture (ISA) ex-
tension that allows efficient generation and verification of
pointer authentication codes (PACs); i.e., keyed message au-
thentication codes (MACs) based on a pointer’s address and
a 64-bit modifier [2]. The PAC is embedded in the unused
bits of a pointer (Figure 2). On 64-bit ARM, the default Linux
configuration uses 16-bit PACs. GNU/Linux has since 5.0
provided support for using PA in user-space. PA provides
new instructions for generating and verifying PACs in point-
ers, and a generic pacga instruction for constructing a 32-bit
MAC based on two 64-bit input registers. After a PAC is
added to a pointer, e.g., using the pacia instruction, it can
be verified later using the corresponding authentication in-
struction, in this case autia. A failed verification does not
immediately cause an exception. Instead, PA corrupts the
pointer so that any subsequent instruction fetch or deref-
erence based on it causes a memory translation fault. The
pacga instruction is an exception as it outputs the produced
PAC to a given destination register; verification in this case
must be performed manually by comparing register values.
Current versions of GCC and LLVM/Clang provide the
-msign-return-address feature that uses PA to protect re-
turn addresses [14]. It signs the return address with the stack
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Figure 4. When using only one canary per stack frame,
an attacker could overflow a stack buffer to corrupt local
variables without overwriting the canary.
pointer (SP) as modifier using pacia lr, sp. The integrity
of the return address is verified before return by issuing the
corresponding authentication instruction autia lr, sp.
Signed return addresses provides similar protection to stack
canaries, i.e., if a stack-buffer overflow corrupts the return
address, this is detected when the return address is verified
before returning from a function (Figure 3). However, PA is
vulnerable to reuse attacks where previously encountered
signed pointers can be used to used to replace latter signed
pointers using the same key and modifier [9]. For instance,
-msign-return-address can be circumvented by reusing a
prior return address signed using the same SP value.
3 Adversary Model
In this work we consider an adversary A that attempts to
compromise the memory safety of a user-space process by
exploiting a stack-buffer overflow. We do not consider ad-
versaries at higher privilege levels, e.g., kernel level access.
However, A can:
• trigger any existing stack-buffer overflow,
• use stack-buffer over-reads to read memory and
• repeatedly restart the process and any child processes
or threads in an attempt to brute force canaries.
Adversaries with arbitrary memory read or write access
cannot be thwarted with canary-based approaches and are
beyond the scope of this work.
We assume that A can analyze the target binary and
therefore knows the exact stack layout of functions (bar-
ring dynamically allocated buffers). This enablesA to target
individual local variables reachable from a particular buffer
overflow without overflowing canaries past the local vari-
ables (Figure 4). If A further manages to exploit a buffer
over-read or other memory disclosure vulnerability, they
could also overflow past the canary by simply replacing the
correct canary value during the overflow.
4 Requirements
To detect linear buffer overflows we require a design that
fulfills the following requirements:
R1 Each canary value should be statistically unique.
R2 Reference canaries must not be modifiable by an A.
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Figure 5. To detect all overflows we we inject canaries after
any vulnerable stack buffer.
R3 A stack buffer must not be able to overflow without
corrupting a canary.
5 Design
We propose PCan, a PA-based canary design that employs
multiple function-specific canaries. By placing canaries after
any array that could overflow (Figure 5), PCan can detect
overflows that only corrupt local variables. This prevents A
from performing precise overflows that corrupt only local
variables without overwriting the canary (R3). To exploit an
overflow without detection A is instead forced to learn the
correct canary values and write them back into place.
In contrast to traditional approaches, PCan avoids attacks
that leak or manipulate in-memory reference canaries by
never storing reference canaries in memory (R2). Instead,
the canaries are either re-generated or verified directly using
PA.A thus cannot manipulate the reference canaries, and is
forced to instead leak the specific on-stack canary or attempt
a brute-force attack.
The canaries are generated with PA, using a modifier con-
sisting of a 16-bit function identifier and the least-significant
48 bits from SP:
mod = SP ∗ 216 + function-id
This modifier makes canaries function-dependent and, when
SP differs, different for each call to the same function (R1). Be-
cause the canaries are generated at run-time and the PA keys
are randomly set on each execution, the generated canaries
are also statistically unique for each execution. To avoid de-
tection A must acquire the exact stack-canary belonging to
the specific function call and cannot rely on pre-calculated
canaries or those belonging to other function calls.
5.1 PA-based canaries
PA-based return-address protection [8, 9, 14] already effec-
tively serves as a canary by detecting return-address corrup-
tion. We therefore propose a design that can be efficiently
and easily integrated with existing return-address protec-
tion schemes, but also provide a stand-alone setup. The first
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canary in a function’s stack frame, protecting the return-
address, is either a pacga-generated stand-alone canary or
the signed return address:
C0 =
{
pacga(SP, mod) if stand-alone
signed_return_address if combined
We denote a canary loaded from the stack withC ′ to indicate
that it might have been corrupted byA. Verification ofC ′0 is
done either by re-generating the stand-alone pacga canary
or by relying on the return-address protection to verify it. To
verify using pacga we re-generate C0 and then check that
C0 = C
′
0.
Subsequent canaries, Ci , i > 0, consist of signed pointers
to the previous canary:
Ci = pacda(Cptri−1, mod), i > 0
where Cptri is a pointer to Ci . Verification of C ′i , i > 0 is
done by authenticating and loading the canary to retrieve
C ′i−1. If any C ′i is corrupted, authentication fails, causing the
subsequent load to fault (Section 2.2) A successful chain of
loads will yield C0, which is then verified as detailed above.
Our stand-alone scheme is more powerful than
-msign-return-address in that it does not rely solely on
the SP value. However, other schemes might provide better
protection for the return address. For instance, PACStack [8]
proposes a scheme that uses statistically unique modifiers to
protect return addresses by maintaining the head of a chain
of PACs in a single reserved register. We propose that PCan
could be combined with such a mechanism by defining mod
as the PACStack authentication token authi and C0 as the
PACStack protected return address. Because the mod in this
case would be statistically unique to a specific call-flow this
would also harden the canaries Ci for i > 0.
6 Implementation
We implement PCan as an extension to LLVM 8.0 and using
the stand-alone pacga approach (Section 5.1). To instrument
the LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR) we added new
LLVM intrinsics for generating and verifying PCan canaries.
These intrinsics, along with instructions for storing and load-
ing the canaries, are added through IR transformations be-
fore entering the target-specific compiler backend. We define
corresponding target-specific intrinsics to leverage built-in
register allocation before converting the intrinsics to hard-
ware instructions in the pre-emit stage.
6.1 Canary creation
To instrument the function prologue PCan locates LLVM
alloca instructions that allocate buffers in the entry ba-
sic block of each function. A new 64-bit allocation for the
canaries is added after each existing alloca. Intrinsics for
generating the canaries and storing them are then added.
The instrumented code will generate a larger stack-frame to
1 canary -creation:
2 mov x8, sp
3 movk x8, #3, lsl #48 ; x8← mod
4 pacga x10 , sp, x8 ; x10← C0
5 sub x9, x29 , #0x8 ; x9← Cptr0
6 pacda x9, x10 ; x9← C1
7 str x9, [sp, #40] ; store C1
8 stur x10 , [x29 , #-8] ; store C0
Listing 1. For a function with two vulnerable stack buffers
PCan generates and stores two canaries.
1 canary -verification:
2 ldr x8, [sp, #40] ; x8← C ′1
3 mov x8, sp
4 movk x8, #3, lsl #48 ; x8← mod
5 autda x8, x29 ; authenticate C ′1
6 ldr x8, [x8] ; x8← C ′0
7 pacga x9, sp, x9 ; x9← C0
8 cmp x8, x9 ; check C0 = C ′0
Listing 2. To verify the integrity of canaries PCan first loads
C ′1, then authenticates it before using it to load C ′0, which in
turn is compared to the re-generated C0.
accommodate the canaries and include code to generate and
store the canary values (Listing 1).
6.2 Canary verification
To verify canaries in the function epilogue, PCan loads them
in reverse order, starting from the last Cn (Listing 2). Each
canary C ′i is authenticated using autda and then derefer-
enced to acquire the next canary C ′i−1. To verify the final
canary, C ′0, PCan first re-generates C0 and then performs a
value comparison. Upon failure, an error handler is invoked,
otherwise the function is allowed to return normally. As sug-
gested in Section 5.1, the final canary can be replaced with a
return-address protection scheme. The return address then
serves as a canary that is verified using the corresponding
protection scheme (e.g., -msign-return-address).
7 Evaluation
Due to lack of publicly available PA-capable hardware we
have used an evaluation approach similar to prior work [8, 9].
We used the ARMv8-A Base Platform Fixed Virtual Platform
(FVP), based on Fast Models 11.5, which supports ARMv8.3-A
for functional evaluation. For performance evaluation we
used the PA-analogue from prior work [8] and performed
measurements on a 96board Kirin 620 HiKey (LeMaker ver-
sion) with an ARMv8-A Cortex A53 Octa-core CPU (1.2GHz)
/ 2GB LPDDR3 SDRAM (800MHz) / 8GB eMMC, running the
Linux kernel v4.18.0 and BusyBox v1.29.2.
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benchmark stack-protector PCan
505.mcf_r −4.78% (4.55) −0.05% (0.13)
519.lbm_r −0.01% (0.01) 0.04% (0.02)
525.x264_r −0.01% (0.01) 1.80% (0.01)
538.imagick_r −0.01% (0.01) 0.19% (0.01)
544.nab_r 0.05% (0.24) −0.18% (0.16)
557.xz_r 0.00% (0.03) 0.04% (0.06)
geo.mean. −0.08% 0.03%
Table 1. SPEC CPU 2017 performance overhead of PCan
and -fstack-protector-strong compared to an uninstru-
mented baseline (standard error for comparison is in paren-
thesis). Results indicate that both schemes incur a negligible
overhead (geometric mean of 0.3% and < 0%, respectively).
7.1 Performance
We evaluated the performance of PCan using SPEC
CPU 20173 benchmark package, and running it on the
HiKey board. We cross-compiled the benchmarks on an
x86 system using whole program LLVM4, and timed the
execution of the individual benchmark programs using
the time utility. Results are reported normalized to a
baseline measured without PCan instrumentation and
compiled with -fno-stack-protector (Figure ??). We
compare this baseline to two different setups; one us-
ing only -fstack-protector-strong and another us-
ing -fno-stack-protector and PCan instrumentation.
Our results indicate that PCan incurs a very low over-
head with a geometric mean of 0.30%. In some cases
-fstack-protector-strong caused the benchmarks, we
suspect this is caused by it rearranging the stack. Measure-
ments were repeated 20 times and all binaries were compiled
with -O2 optimizations enabled.
7.2 Security
The initial pacga canaries used by PCan provide similar
security to traditional canaries. To perform an overflow
while avoiding detectionA must achieve the following goals:
1) find the location of canaries in relation to the overflown
buffer, 2) leak the specific canary values on the stack, and
3) write back the correct canaries when performing the buffer
overflow. In our adversary model step 1) is trivial; A can in-
spect the binary to analyze the stack layout. Step 2) could be
achieved by leaking or modifying the in-memory reference
values, but because PCan generates canaries on-demand, A
is forced to leak the values from the stack (R2). Moreover,
because the canaries are statistically unique to a function
and SP value A cannot rely on finding just any canary and
substitute it with one in the overflown stack frame (R1). This
3https://www.spec.org/cpu2017/
4https://github.com/travitch/whole-program-llvm
limits the scope of attacks, as both the memory leak and over-
flow must happen within the lifetime of the attacked stack
frame. By using multiple canaries—one after each buffer—
PCan can detect overflows that only touch local variables
(R3). Based on our evaluation PCan thus provides compre-
hensive protection with an overhead similar to currently
deployed defenses.
8 Related Work
After the seminal article “Smashing the Stack for fun and
profit” [12], the notion of canaries as a protection against
buffer overflow was first introduced in StackGuard [3], and
initial GCC compiler support appeared at the same time.
StackGuard proposes to use a random canary, stored at the
top of the stack (or in the thread local storage memory area),
during program launch to thwart canary harvesting from
the compiled code. The threat of canary harvesting and the
added protection (especially for C) provided by terminator
canaries was identified shortly thereafter [4]. The problem
of canary copy and re-use was already identified by Etoh
and Yoda in 2000 [5], where the stack-frame based canary
protection was augmented by masking the canary value with
the function return address. Later, Strackx et al. [18] argue
against the futility of storing secrets in program memory,
which supports using PA to generate canaries dynamically.
Another shortcoming of canary integrity are cases when
the canary mechanism is subject to brute-force attacks, e.g.,
in the context of process forking. A could use the canaries
in forked child processes as oracles to perform brute-force
guessing of canary values. Published solutions against this
form of attack includes DynaGuard [13] and DCR [6]. Both
solutions keep track of canary positions in the code, and
re-initialize all canaries in a child process, at considerable
performance overhead. DCR optimizes the canary location
tracking by chaining canaries using embedded offsets - we
inherit this notion of chaining canaries from their work,
although we deploy these for canary validation whereas
DCR uses the mechanism for canary rewriting. By combin-
ing the SP in the canaries PCan provides some protection
against such attacks, but comprehensive protection would
require a similar approach of re-initializing canaries on fork.
Finally, the polymorphic canaries by Wang et al. [20] op-
timize away the need to rewrite canaries during fork, by
adding a function-specific random mask to the stack canary,
which effectively removes the opportunity for systematic
canary brute-forcing.
Heap protection with canaries has received much less
attention than stack protection, possibly because the opti-
mal balance between validation and performance overhead
when canaries are applied to the heap remains an open prob-
lem. The first paper on the subject was Robertson et al. in
2003 [15], but a more recent mechanism — HeapSentry by
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Nikiforakis et al. [11] puts effort on the unpredictability (ran-
domness) of the heap canaries. HeapSentry consists of a
wrapper for the allocator and a kernel module, and clocks in
overheads at around 12%. Pointer bounds checking schemes
offer protections stronger than canaries alone, but in com-
parison incur significant performance overheads [19].
9 Future Work
Our current approach only protects stack-based variables
with a static size. Canaries for dynamic allocations cannot
be verified in the prologue because they might be either out
of scope or overwritten by later dynamic allocations, and are
currently not used by PCan. To prevent attacks that corrupt
dynamic allocations, we propose to add instrumentation that
protects dynamic allocations based on their life-time, i.e.,
which verifies the associated canaries immediately when
the allocation goes out of scope. The existing LLVM alloca-
tion life-time tracking could be leveraged to implement this
addition without significant changes to the compiler.
We plan to refine and expand our canary approach by
using compile-time analysis—i.e., the StackSafetyAnalysis 5
of LLVM—to omit instrumentation of buffers that can be stat-
ically shown to be safe. In some cases A could achieve their
goal before function return, i.e., before the canary corruption
is detected. Such attacks could be detected earlier by utilizing
the StackSafetyAnalysis to add checks after vulnerable steps
during function execution, before the function epilogue.
We also plan to extend PCan instrumentation to cover
heap allocations, similar to HeapSentry [15]. Because the
PA-keys are managed by the kernel, PCan could be used for
HeapSentry-like consistency checks from within the kernel,
e.g., before executing system-calls.
10 Conclusion
Canaries are a well-established protection tool against er-
rors occurring in programs written in memory-unsafe lan-
guages. We present PCan, which provides hardware-assisted
integrity-protection for canaries, inhibiting the most preva-
lent canary-circumvention techniques. Furthermore, we pro-
pose the notion of fine-grained canaries, where canaries are
not only placed to protect the return address, but can be
used to identify overflows even in individual data objects.
We make available PCan, a compiler prototype, and provide
real world measurements outlining the performance impact
of the proposed solution variants. Finally we point to further
strategies for optimizing the use of our fine-grained canaries,
as well as providing a solution path for protecting dynamic
allocations.
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